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Abstract
We give a purely model-theoretic characterization of the semantics of logic
programs with negation-as-failure allowed in clause bodies. In our semantics the
meaning of a program is, as in the classical case, the unique minimum model in
a program-independent ordering. We use an expanded truth domain that has
an uncountable linearly ordered set of truth values between False (the minimum
element) and True (the maximum), with a Zero element in the middle. The truth
values below Zero are ordered like the countable ordinals. The values above Zero
have exactly the reverse order. Negation is interpreted as reflection about Zero
followed by a step towards Zero; the only truth value that remains unaffected
by negation is Zero. We show that every program has a unique minimum model
MP , and that this model can be constructed with a TP iteration which proceeds
through the countable ordinals. Furthermore, we demonstrate that MP can also
be obtained through a model intersection construction which generalizes the well-
known model intersection theorem for classical logic programming. Finally, we
show that by collapsing the true and false values of the infinite-valued model MP
to (the classical) True and False, we obtain a three-valued model identical to the
well-founded one.
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1 Introduction
One of the paradoxes of logic programming is that such a small fragment of formal
logic serves as such a powerful programming language. This contrast has led to many
attempts to make the language more powerful by extending the fragment, but these
attempts generally back-fire. The extended languages can be implemented, and are in
a sense more powerful; but these extensions usually disrupt the relationship between
the meaning of programs as programs and the meaning as logic. In these cases the
implementation of the program-as-program can no longer be considered as computing
a distinguished model of the program-as-logic. Even worse, the result of running the
program may not correspond to any model at all.
The problem is illustrated by the many attempts to extend logic programming with
negation (of atoms in the clause bodies). The generally accepted computational inter-
pretation of negated atoms is negation-as-failure. Intuitively, a goal ∼A succeeds iff the
subcomputation which attempts to establish A terminates and fails. Despite its simple
computational formulation, negation-as-failure proved to be extremely difficult to for-
malize from a semantic point of view (an overview of the existing semantic treatments
is given in the next section). Moreover, the existing approaches are not purely model
theoretic in the sense that the meaning of a given program can not be computed by
solely considering its set of models. This is a sharp difference from classical logic pro-
gramming (without negation), in which every program has a unique minimum Herbrand
model (which is the intersection of all its Herbrand models).
This paper presents a purely model-theoretic semantics for negation-as-failure in logic
programming. In our semantics the meaning of a program is, as in the classical case, the
unique minimum model in a program-independent ordering. The main contributions of
the paper can be summarized as follows:
• We argue that a purely declarative semantics for logic programs with negation-as-
failure should be based on an infinite-valued logic. For this purpose we introduce
an expanded truth domain that has an uncountable linearly ordered set of truth
values between False (the minimum element) and True (the maximum), with a
Zero element in the middle. The truth values below Zero are ordered like the
countable ordinals while those above Zero have the reverse order. This new truth
domain allows us to define in a logical way the meaning of negation-as-failure and
to distinguish it in a very clear manner from classical negation.
• We introduce the notions of infinite-valued interpretation and infinite-valued model
for logic programs. Moreover, we define a partial ordering ⊑∞ on infinite-valued
interpretations which generalizes the subset ordering of classical interpretations.
We then demonstrate that every logic program that uses negation-as-failure, has a
unique minimum (infinite-valued) model MP under ⊑∞. This model can be con-
structed by appropriately iterating a simple TP operator through the countable
ordinals. From an algorithmic point of view, the construction of MP proceeds in
an analogous way as the iterated least fixpoint approach [Prz89]. There exist how-
ever crucial differences. First and most important, the proposed approach aims
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at producing a unique minimum model of the program; this requirement leads to
a more demanding logical setting than existing approaches and the construction
of MP is guided by the use of a family of relations on infinite-valued interpre-
tations. Second, the definition of TP in the infinite-valued approach is a simple
and natural extension of the corresponding well-known operator for classical logic
programming; in the existing approaches the operators used are complicated by
the need to keep track of the values produced at previous levels of the iteration.
Of course, the proposed approach is connected to the existing ones since, as we
demonstrate, if we collapse the true and false values of MP to (classical) True and
False we get the well-founded model.
• We demonstrate that by considering infinite-valued models, we can derive a model
intersection theorem for logic programs with negation-as-failure. The model pro-
duced by the model intersection theorem coincides with the model MP produced
by TP . To our knowledge, this is the first such result in the area of negation (be-
cause model intersection does not hold if one restricts attention to either two or
three-valued semantical approaches).
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 discusses the problem of negation
and gives a brief outline of the most established semantic approaches. Section 3 out-
lines the infinite-valued approach. Section 4 introduces infinite-valued interpretations
and models, and discusses certain orderings on interpretations that will play a vital
role in defining the infinite-valued semantics. The TP operator on infinite-valued inter-
pretations is defined in Section 5 and an important property of the operator, namely
α-monotonicity, is established. In Section 6, the construction of the model MP is pre-
sented. Section 7 establishes various properties of MP , the most important of which is
the fact that MP is the minimum model of P under the ordering relation ⊑∞. Section 8
introduces the model intersection theorem and demonstrates that the model produced
in this way is identical to MP . Finally, Section 9 concludes the paper with discussion
on certain aspects of the infinite-valued approach.
2 The Problem of Negation-as-Failure
The semantics of negation-as-failure is possibly the most broadly studied problem in
the theory of logic programming. In this section we first discuss the problem and then
present the main solutions that have been proposed until now.
2.1 The Problem
Negation-as-failure is a notion that can be described operationally in a very simple way,
but whose denotational semantics has been extremely difficult to specify. This appears
to be a more general phenomenon in the theory of programming languages:
“It seems to be a general rule that programming language features and con-
cepts which are simple operationally tend to be complex denotationally,
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whereas those which are simple denotationally tend to be complex opera-
tionally” [AW82].
The basic idea behind negation-as-failure has as follows: suppose that we are given the
goal ← ∼A. Now, if ← A succeeds, then ← ∼A fails; if ← A fails finitely, then ← ∼A
succeeds. For example, given the program
p ←
r ← ∼p
s ← ∼q
the query ← r fails because p succeeds, while ← s succeeds because q fails.
To illustrate the problems that result from the above interpretation of negation,
consider an even simpler program:
works ← ∼tired
Under the negation-as-failure rule, the meaning of the above program is captured by
the model in which tired is False and works is True.
Consider on the other hand the program:
tired ← ∼works
In this case, the correct model under negation-as-failure is the one in which works is
False and tired is True.
However, the above two programs have exactly the same classical models, namely:
M0 = {(tired, False), (works, T rue)}
M1 = {(tired, T rue), (works, False)}
M2 = {(tired, T rue), (works, T rue)}
We therefore have a situation in which two programs have the same model theory
(set of models), but different computational meanings. Obviously, this implies that the
computational meaning does not have a purely model theoretic specification. In other
words, one can not determine the intended model of a logic program that uses negation-
as-failure by just examining its set of models. This is a very sharp difference from logic
programming without negation in which every program has a unique minimum model.
2.2 The Existing Solutions
The first attempt to give a semantics to negation-as-failure was the so-called program
completion approach introduced by Clark [Cla78]. In the completion of a program the
“if” rules are replaced by “if and only if” ones and also an equality theory is added
to the program (for a detailed presentation of the technique, see [Llo87]). The main
problem is that the completion of a program may in certain cases be inconsistent. To
circumvent the problem, Fitting [Fit85] considered 3-valued Herbrand models of the
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program completion. Later, Kunen [Kun87] identified a weaker version of Fitting’s
semantics which is recursively enumerable. However, the last two approaches do not
overcome all the objections that have been raised regarding the completion (see for
example the discussion in [PP90] and in [vG93]).
Although the program completion approach proved useful in many application do-
mains, it has been superseded by other semantic approaches, usually termed under the
name canonical model semantics. The basic idea of the canonical model approach is
to choose among the models of a program a particular one which is presumed to be
the model that the programmer had in mind. The canonical model is usually chosen
among many incomparable minimal models of the program. Since (as discussed in the
last subsection) the selection of the canonical model can not be performed by just ex-
amining the set of (classical) models of the program, the choice of the canonical model
is inevitably driven by the syntax of the program. In the following we discuss the main
semantic approaches that have resulted from this body of research.
A semantic construction that produces a single model is the so-called stratified se-
mantics [ABW88]. Informally speaking, a program is stratified if it does not contain
cyclic dependencies of predicate names through negation. Every stratified logic program
has a unique perfect model, which can be constructed in stages. As an example, consider
again the program:
p ←
r ← ∼p
s ← ∼q
The basic idea in the construction of the perfect model is to rank the predicate variables
according to the maximum “depth” of negation used in their defining clauses. The
variables of rank 0 (like p and q above) are defined in terms of each other without use
of negation. The variables of rank 1 (like r and s) are defined in terms of each other
and those of rank 0, with negation applied only to variables of rank 0. Those of rank
2 are defined with negations applied only to variables of rank 1 and 0; and so on. The
model can then be constructed in stages. The clauses for the rank 0 variables form a
standard logic program, and its minimum model is used to assign values for the rank
0 variables. These are then treated as constants, so that the clauses for the rank 1
variables no longer have negations. The minimum model is used to assign values to the
rank 1 variables, which are in turn converted to constants; and so on.
An extension of the notion of stratification is local stratification [Prz88]; intuitively,
in a locally stratified program, predicates may depend negatively on themselves as long
as no cycles are formed when the rules of the program are instantiated. Again, every
locally stratified program has a unique perfect model [Prz88]. The construction of the
perfect model can be performed in an analogous way as in the stratified case (the basic
difference being that one can allow infinite countable ordinals as ranks). It is worth not-
ing that although stratification is obviously a syntactically determinable condition, local
stratification is generally undecidable [CB94]. It should also be noted here that there
exist some interesting cases of logic programming languages where one can establish
some intermediate notion between stratification and local stratification which is power-
ful and decidable. For example, in temporal logic programming [Org94, OW92] many
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different temporal stratification notions have been defined, and corresponding decision
tests have been proposed [ZAO93, Lud98, Ron01].
The stratified and locally stratified semantics fail for programs in which some vari-
ables are defined (directly or indirectly) in terms of their own negations, because these
variables are never ranked. For such programs we need an extra intermediate neutral
truth value for certain of the negatively recursively defined variables. This approach
yields the “well-founded” construction and it can be shown [vGRS91] that the result
is indeed a model of the program. Many different constructive definitions of the well-
founded model have been proposed; two of the most well-known ones are the alternating
fixpoint [vG89, vG93] and the iterated least fixpoint [Prz89]. The well-founded model
approach is compatible with stratification (it is well-known that the well-founded model
of a locally stratified program coincides with its unique perfect model [vGRS91]).
An approach that differs in philosophy from the previous ones is the so-called stable
model semantics [GL88]. While the “canonical model” approaches assign to a given
program a unique “intended” model, the stable model semantics assigns to the program
a (possibly empty) family of “intended” models. For example, the program
p ← ∼p
does not have any stable models while the program
p ← ∼q
q ← ∼p
has two stable models. The stable model semantics is defined through an elegant stability
transformation [GL88]. The relationships between the stable model semantics and the
previously mentioned canonical model approaches are quite close. It is well-known that
every locally stratified program has a unique stable model which coincides with its unique
perfect model [GL88]. Moreover, if a program has a two-valued well-founded model then
this coincides with its unique stable model [vGRS91] (but the converse of this does not
hold in general, see again [vGRS91]). Finally, as it is demonstrated in [Prz90], the
notion of stable model can be extended to a three-valued setting; then, the well-founded
model can be characterized as the smallest (more precisely, the F-least, see [Prz90])
three-valued stable model. The stable model approach has triggered the creation of a
new promising programming paradigm, namely answer-set programming [MT99, GL02].
It should be noted at this point that the infinite-valued approach proposed in this
paper contributes to the area of the “canonical model” approaches (and not in the area
of stable model semantics). In fact, as we argue in the next section, the infinite-valued
semantics is the purely model theoretic framework under which the existing canonical
model approaches fall.
The discussion in this section gives only a top-level presentation of the research that
has been performed regarding the semantics of negation-as-failure. For a more in-depth
treatment, the interested reader should consult the many existing surveys for this area
(such as for example [AB94, BG94, PP90, Fit02]).
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3 The Infinite-Valued Approach
There is a general feeling (which we share) that when one seeks a unique model, then the
well-founded semantics is the right approach to negation-as-failure. There still remains
however a question about its legitimacy, mainly because the well-founded model is in
fact one of the minimal models of the program and not a minimum one. In other words,
there is nothing that distinguishes it as a model.
Our goal is to remove the last doubts surrounding the well-founded model by pro-
viding a purely model theoretic semantics (the infinite-valued semantics) which is com-
patible with the well-founded model, but in which every program with negation has a
unique minimum model. In our semantics whenever two programs have the same set of
infinite-valued models then they have the same minimum model.
Informally, we extend the domain of truth values and use these extra values to
distinguish between ordinary negation and negation-as-failure, which we see as being
strictly weaker. Consider again the program:
p ←
r ← ∼p
s ← ∼q
Under the negation-as-failure approach both p and s receive the value True. We would
argue, however, that in some sense p is “truer” than s. Namely, p is true because there
is a rule which says so, whereas s is true only because we are never obliged to make q
true. In a sense, s is true only by default. Our truth domain adds a “default” truth
value T1 just below the “real” truth T0, and (by symmetry) a weaker false value F1 just
above (“not as false as”) the real false F0. We can then understand negation-as-failure as
combining ordinary negation with a weakening. Thus ∼F0 = T1 and ∼T0 = F1. Since
negations can effectively be iterated, our domain requires a whole sequence . . . , T3, T2, T1
of weaker and weaker truth values below T0 but above the neutral value 0; and a mirror
image sequence F1, F2, F3 . . . above F0 and below 0. In fact, to capture the well-founded
model in full generality, we need a Tα and a Fα for every countable ordinal α.
We show that, over this extended domain, every logic program with negation has a
unique minimum model; and that in this model, if we collapse all the Tα and Fα to True
and False respectively, we get the three-valued well-founded model. For the example
program above, the minimum model is {(p, T0), (q, F0), (r, F1), (s, T1)}. This collapses
to {(p, T rue), (q, False), (r, False), (s, T rue)}, which is the well-founded model of the
program.
Consider now again the program works←∼tired. The minimum model in this case
is {(tired, F0), (works, T1)}. On the other hand, for the program tired←∼works the
minimum model is {(tired, T1), (works, F0)}. As it will become clearer in the next
section, the minimum model of the first program is not a model of the second program,
and vice-versa. Therefore, the two programs do not have the same set of infinite-valued
models and the paradox identified in the previous section, disappears. Alternatively, in
the infinite-valued semantics the programs works ←∼tired and tired ←∼works are
no longer logically equivalent.
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The proof of our minimum-model result proceeds in a manner analogous to the
classical proof in the negation-free case. The main complication is that we need extra
auxiliary relations to characterize the transitions between stages in the construction.
This complication is unavoidable and due to the fact that in our infinite truth domain
negation-as-failure is still antimonotonic. The approximations do converge on the least
model, but not monotonically (or even anti-monotonically). Instead (speaking loosely)
the values of variables with standard denotations (T0 and F0) are computed first, then
those (T1 and F1) one level weaker, then those two levels weaker, and so on. We need a
family of relations between models to keep track of this intricate process (whose result,
nevertheless, has a simple characterization).
4 Infinite Valued Models
In this section we define infinite-valued interpretations and infinite-valued models of
programs. In the following discussion we assume familiarity with the basic notions of
logic programming [Llo87]. We consider the class of normal logic programs:
Definition 4.1 A normal program clause is a clause whose body is a conjunction of
literals. A normal logic program is a finite set of normal program clauses.
We follow a common practice in the area of negation, which dictates that instead of
studying (finite) logic programs it is more convenient to study their (possibly infinite)
ground instantiations [Fit02]:
Definition 4.2 If P is a normal logic program, its associated ground instantiation P ∗
is constructed as follows: first, put in P ∗ all ground instances of members of P ; second,
if a clause A← with empty body occurs in P ∗, replace it with A← true; finally, if the
ground atom A is not the head of any member of P ∗, add A← false.
The program P ∗ is in essence a (generally infinite) propositional program. In the rest
of this paper, we will assume that all programs under consideration (unless otherwise
stated) are of this form.
The existing approaches to the semantics of negation are either two-valued or three-
valued. The two-valued approaches are based on classical logic that uses the truth values
False and True. The three-valued approaches are based on a three-valued logic that uses
False, 0 and True. The element 0 captures the notion of undefined. The truth values
are ordered as: False < 0 < True (see for example [Prz89]).
The basic idea behind the proposed approach is that in order to obtain a minimum
model semantics for logic programs with negation, it is necessary to consider a much
more refined multiple-valued logic which is based on an infinite set of truth values,
ordered as follows:
F0 < F1 < · · · < Fω < · · · < Fα < · · · < 0 < · · · < Tα < · · · < Tω < · · · < T1 < T0
Intuitively, F0 and T0 are the classical False and True values and 0 is the undefined
value. The values below 0 are ordered like the countable ordinals. The values above
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0 have exactly the reverse order. The intuition behind the new values is that they
express different levels of truthfulness and falsity. In the following we denote by V the
set consisting of the above truth values. A notion that will prove useful in the sequel is
that of the order of a given truth value:
Definition 4.3 The order of a truth value is defined as: order(Tα) = α, order(Fα) = α
and order(0) = +∞.
The notion of “Herbrand interpretation of a program” can now be generalized:
Definition 4.4 An (infinite-valued) interpretation I of a program P is a function from
the Herbrand Base BP of P to V .
In the rest of the paper, the term “interpretation” will mean an infinite-valued one
(unless otherwise stated). As a special case of interpretation, we will use ∅ to denote
the interpretation that assigns the F0 value to all atoms of a program.
In order to define the notion of model of a given program, we need to extend the
notion of interpretation to apply to literals, to conjunctions of literals and to the two
constants true and false (for the purposes of this paper it is not actually needed to
extend I to more general formulas):
Definition 4.5 Let I be an interpretation of a given program P . Then, I can be ex-
tended as follows:
• For every negative atom ∼p appearing in P :
I(∼p) =


Tα+1 if I(p) = Fα
Fα+1 if I(p) = Tα
0 if I(p) = 0
• For every conjunction of literals l1, . . . , ln appearing as the body of a clause in P :
I(l1, . . . , ln) = min{I(l1), . . . , I(ln)}
Moreover, I(true) = T0 and I(false) = F0.
It is important to note that the above definition provides a purely logical charac-
terization of what negation-as-failure is; moreover, it clarifies the difference between
classical negation (which is simply reflection about 0) and negation-as-failure (which is
reflection about 0 followed by a step towards 0). The operational intuition behind the
above definition is that the more times a value is iterated through negation, the closer
to zero it gets.
The notion of satisfiability of a clause can now be defined:
Definition 4.6 Let P be a program and I an interpretation of P . Then, I satisfies
a clause p ← l1, . . . , ln of P if I(p) ≥ I(l1, . . . , ln). Moreover, I is a model of P if I
satisfies all clauses of P .
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Given an interpretation of a program, we adopt specific notations for the set of predicate
symbols of the program that are assigned a specific truth value and for the subset of
the interpretation that corresponds to a particular order:
Definition 4.7 Let P be a program, I an interpretation of P and v ∈ V . Then I ‖ v =
{p ∈ BP | I(p) = v}. Moreover, if α is a countable ordinal, then I♯α = {(p, v) ∈ I |
order(v) = α}.
The following relations on interpretations will prove useful in the rest of the paper:
Definition 4.8 Let I and J be interpretations of a given program P and α be a count-
able ordinal. We write I =α J , if for all β ≤ a, I ‖ Tβ = J ‖ Tβ and I ‖ Fβ = J ‖ Fβ.
Example 4.9 Let I = {(p, T0), (q, T1), (r, T2)} and J = {(p, T0), (q, T1), (r, F2)}. Then,
I =1 J , but it is not the case that I =2 J .
Definition 4.10 Let I and J be interpretations of a given program P and α be a count-
able ordinal. We write I ❁α J , if for all β < a, I =β J and either I ‖ Tα ⊂ J ‖ Tα and
I ‖ Fα ⊇ J ‖ Fα, or I ‖ Tα ⊆ J ‖ Tα and I ‖ Fα ⊃ J ‖ Fα. We write I ⊑α J if I =α J
or I ❁α J .
Example 4.11 Let I = {(p, T0), (q, T1), (r, F2)} and J = {(p, T0), (q, T1), (r, T2)}. Ob-
viously, I ❁2 J .
Definition 4.12 Let I and J be interpretations of a given program P . We write I ❁∞
J , if there exists a countable ordinal α such that I ❁α J . We write I ⊑∞ J if either
I = J or I ❁∞ J .
It is easy to see that the relation ⊑∞ on the set of interpretations of a given program,
is a partial order (ie. it is reflexive, transitive and antisymmetric). On the other hand,
for every countable ordinal α, the relation ⊑α is a preorder (ie. reflexive and transitive).
The following lemma gives a condition related to ⊑∞ which will be used in a later
section:
Lemma 4.13 Let I and J be two interpretations of a given program P . If for all p in
P it is I(p) ≤ J(p), then I ⊑∞ J .
Proof. If I = J then obviously I ⊑∞ J . Assume I 6= J and let α be the least
countable ordinal such that I♯α 6= J♯α. Now, for every p in P such that J(p) = Fα,
we have I(p) ≤ Fα. However, since I and J agree on their values of order less than α,
we have I(p) = Fα. Therefore, I ‖ Fα ⊇ J ‖ Fα. On the other hand, for every p in P
such that I(p) = Tα, we have J(p) ≥ Tα. Since I and J agree on their values of order
less than α, we have J(p) = Tα. Therefore, I ‖ Tα ⊆ J ‖ Tα. Since I♯α 6= J♯α, we get
I ❁α J which implies I ⊑∞ J .
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The relation ⊑∞ will be used in the coming sections in order to define the minimum
model semantics for logic programs with negation-as-failure.
Example 4.14 Consider the program P :
p ← ∼q
q ← false
It can easily be seen that the interpretation MP = {(p, T1), (q, F0)} is the least one
(with respect to ⊑∞) among all infinite-valued models of P . In other words, for every
infinite-valued model N of P , it is MP ⊑∞ N .
We can now define a notion of monotonicity that will be the main tool in defining the
infinite-valued semantics:
Definition 4.15 Let P be a program and let α be a countable ordinal. A function Φ from
the set of interpretations of P to the set of interpretations of P is called α-monotonic
iff for all interpretations I and J of P , I ⊑α J ⇒ Φ(I) ⊑α Φ(J).
Based on the notions defined above, we can now define and examine the properties of
an immediate consequence operator for logic programs with negation-as-failure.
5 The Immediate Consequence Operator
In this section we demonstrate that one can easily define a TP operator for logic pro-
grams with negation, based on the notions developed in the last section. Moreover,
we demonstrate that this operator is α-monotonic for all countable ordinals α. The α-
monotonicity allows us to prove that this new TP has a least fixpoint, for which however
ω iterations are not sufficient. The procedure required for getting the least fixpoint is
more subtle than that for classical logic programs, and will be described shortly.
Definition 5.1 Let P be a program and let I be an interpretation of P . The operator
TP is defined as follows:
1
TP (I)(p) = lub{I(l1, . . . , ln) | p← l1, . . . , ln ∈ P}
TP is called the immediate consequence operator for P .
The following lemma demonstrates that TP is well-defined:
Lemma 5.2 Every subset of the set V of truth values has a least upper bound.
1The notation TP (I)(p) is possibly more familiar to people having some experience with functional
programming: TP (I)(p) is the value assigned to p by the interpretation TP (I).
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Proof. Let VF and VT be the subsets of V that correspond to the false and true values
respectively. Let S be a subset of V . Consider first the case in which S∩VT is nonempty.
Then, since VT is a reverse well-order, the subset S ∩ VT must have a greatest element,
which is clearly the least upper bound of S.
Now assume that S ∩ VT is empty. Then, the intermediate truth value 0 is an upper
bound of S. If there are no other upper bounds in VF , then 0 is the least upper bound.
But if the set of upper bounds of S in VF is non empty, it must have a least element,
because VF is well ordered; and this least element is clearly the least upper bound of S
in the whole truth domain V .
Example 5.3 Consider the program:
p ← ∼q
p ← ∼p
q ← false
and the interpretation I = {(p, T0), (q, T1)}. Then, TP (I) = {(p, F2), (q, F0)}.
Example 5.4 For a more demanding example consider the following infinite program:
p0 ← false q ← p0
p1 ← ∼p0 q ← p1
p2 ← ∼p1 q ← p2
p3 ← ∼p2 q ← p3
. . . . . .
Let I = {(q, F0), (p0, F0), (p1, F1), (p2, F2), . . .}. Then, it can be easily seen that TP (I) =
{(q, Fω), (p0, F0), (p1, T1), (p2, T2), . . .}.
One basic property of TP is that it is α-monotonic, a property that is illustrated by the
following example:
Example 5.5 Consider the program:
p ← ∼q
q ← false
Let I = {(q, F0), (p, T2)} and J = {(q, F1), (p, T0)}. Clearly, I ⊑0 J . It can easily
be seen that TP (I) = {(q, F0), (p, T1)} and TP (J) = {(q, F0), (p, T2)}, and obviously
TP (I) ⊑0 TP (J).
The following lemma establishes the α-monotonicity of TP . Notice that a similar lemma
also holds for the well-founded semantics (see for example [Prz89]).
Lemma 5.6 The immediate consequence operator TP is α-monotonic, for all countable
ordinals α.
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Proof. The proof is by transfinite induction on α. Assume the lemma holds for all
β < α. We demonstrate that it also holds for α.
Let I, J be two interpretations of P such that I ⊑α J . We first establish that the
values of order less that α remain intact by TP . Since I ⊑α J , for all β < α we have
I ⊑β J and J ⊑β I. By the induction hypothesis, we have that TP (I) ⊑β TP (J) and
TP (J) ⊑β TP (I), which implies that TP (I) =β TP (J), for all β < α. It remains to show
that TP (I) ‖ Tα ⊆ TP (J) ‖ Tα and that TP (I) ‖ Fα ⊇ TP (J) ‖ Fα. We distinguish these
two cases.
We first demonstrate that TP (I) ‖ Tα ⊆ TP (J) ‖ Tα. Assume that for some predicate
p in P it is TP (I)(p) = Tα. We need to show that TP (J)(p) = Tα. Obviously, TP (J)(p) ≤
Tα since TP (I) =β TP (J), for all β < α. Consider now the fact that TP (I)(p) = Tα.
This implies that there exists a rule of the form p ← q1, . . . , qn,∼ w1, . . . ,∼ wm in P
whose body evaluates under I to the value Tα. This means that for all qi, 1 ≤ i ≤ n,
it is I(qi) ≥ Tα and for all wi, 1 ≤ i ≤ m, it is I(∼ wi) ≥ Tα (or equivalently,
I(wi) < Fα). But then, since I ⊑α J , the evaluation of the body of the above rule
under the interpretation J also results to the value Tα. This together with the fact that
TP (J)(p) ≤ Tα allows us to conclude (using the definition of TP ) that TP (J)(p) = Tα.
It now remains to demonstrate that TP (I) ‖ Fα ⊇ TP (J) ‖ Fα. Assume that for some
predicate p in P it is TP (J)(p) = Fα. We need to show that TP (I)(p) = Fα. Obviously,
TP (I)(p) ≥ Fα since TP (I) =β TP (J), for all β < α. Now, the fact that TP (J)(p) = Fα
implies that for every rule for p in P , the body of the rule has a value under J that is
less than or equal to Fα. Therefore, if p ← q1, . . . , qn,∼ w1, . . . ,∼ wm is one of these
rules, then either there exists a qi, 1 ≤ i ≤ n, such that J(qi) ≤ Fα, or there exists a
wi, 1 ≤ i ≤ m, such that J(∼wi) ≤ Fα (or equivalently J(wi) > Tα). But then, since
I ⊑α J , the body of the above rule evaluates under I to a value less than or equal to
Fα. Therefore, TP (I)(p) ≤ Fα. This together with the fact that TP (J)(p) ≥ Fα imply
that TP (J)(p) = Fα.
It is natural to wonder whether TP is monotonic with respect to the relation ⊑∞.
This is not the case, as the following example illustrates:
Example 5.7 Consider the program:
p ← ∼q
s ← p
t ← ∼s
t ← u
u ← t
q ← false
Consider the following interpretations: I = {(p, T1), (q, F0), (s, F0), (t, T1), (u, F0)} and
J = {(p, T1), (q, F0), (s, F1), (t, F1), (u, F1)}. Obviously, it is I ⊑∞ J because I ❁0 J .
However, we have TP (I) = {(p, T1), (q, F0), (s, T1), (t, T1), (u, T1)} and also TP (J) =
{(p, T1), (q, F0), (s, T1), (t, T2), (u, F1)}. Clearly, TP (I) 6⊑∞ TP (J).
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The fact that TP is not monotonic under ⊑∞ appears to suggest that if we want to
find the least (with respect to ⊑∞) fixpoint of TP , we should not rely on approximations
based on the relation ⊑∞. The way that this minimum fixpoint can be constructed, is
described in the following section.
6 Construction of the Minimum Model MP
In this section we demonstrate how the minimum model MP of a given program P can
be constructed. The construction can informally be described as follows. As a first
approximation to MP , we start with the interpretation that assigns to every atom of
P the value F0 (as already mentioned, this interpretation is denoted by ∅). We start
iterating the TP on ∅ until both the set of atoms that have a F0 value and the set of
atoms having a T0 value, stabilize. We keep all these atoms whose values have stabilized
and reset the values of all remaining atoms to the next false value (namely F1). The
procedure is repeated until the F1 and T1 values stabilize, and we reset the remaining
atoms to a value equal to F2, and so on. Since the Herbrand Base of P is countable,
there exists a countable ordinal δ for which this process will not produce any new atoms
having Fδ or Tδ values. At this point we stop the iterations and reset all remaining
atoms to the value 0. The above process is illustrated by the following example:
Example 6.1 Consider the program:
p ← ∼q
q ← ∼r
s ← p
s ← ∼s
r ← false
We start from the interpretation I = {(p, F0), (q, F0), (r, F0), (s, F0)}. Iterating the
immediate consequence operator twice, we get in turn the following two interpretations:
{(p, T1), (q, T1), (r, F0), (s, T1)}
{(p, F2), (q, T1), (r, F0), (s, T1)}
Notice that the set of atoms having an F0 value as well as the set of atoms having a T0
value, have stabilized (there is only one atom having an F0 value and none having a T0
one). Therefore, we reset the values of all other atoms to F1 and repeat the process until
the F1 and T1 values converge:
{(p, F1), (q, F1), (r, F0), (s, F1)}
{(p, T2), (q, T1), (r, F0), (s, T2)}
{(p, F2), (q, T1), (r, F0), (s, T2)}
Now, the order 1 values have converged, so we reset all remaining values to F2 and
continue the iterations:
{(p, F2), (q, T1), (r, F0), (s, F2)}
{(p, F2), (q, T1), (r, F0), (s, T3)}
{(p, F2), (q, T1), (r, F0), (s, F4)}
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The order 2 values have converged, and we reset the value of s to F3:
{(p, F2), (q, T1), (r, F0), (s, F3)}
{(p, F2), (q, T1), (r, F0), (s, T4)}
The fact that we do not get any order 3 value implies that we have reached the end of
the iterations. The final model results by setting the value of s to 0:
MP = {(p, F2), (q, T1), (r, F0), (s, 0)}
As it will be demonstrated, this is the minimum model of the program under ⊑∞.
The above notions are formalized by the definitions that follow.
Definition 6.2 Let P be a program, let I be an interpretation of P and α a countable
ordinal. Moreover, assume that I ⊑α TP (I) ⊑α T
2
P (I) ⊑α · · · ⊑α T
n
P (I) ⊑α · · · , n < ω.
Then, the sequence {T nP (I)}n<ω is called an α-chain.
Definition 6.3 Let P be a program, let I be an interpretation of P and assume that
{T nP (I)}n<ω is an α-chain. Then, we define the interpretation T
ω
P,α(I) as follows:
T ωP,α(I)(p) =


I(p) if order(I(p)) < α
Tα if p ∈
⋃
n<ω(T
n
P (I) ‖ Tα)
Fα if p ∈
⋂
n<ω(T
n
P (I) ‖ Fα)
Fα+1 otherwise
The proof of the following lemma follows directly from the above definition:
Lemma 6.4 Let P be a program, I an interpretation of P and α a countable ordinal.
Assume that {T nP (I)}n<ω is an α-chain. Then, for all n < ω, T
n
P (I) ⊑α T
ω
P,α(I). More-
over, for all interpretations J such that for all n < ω, T nP (I) ⊑α J , it is T
ω
P,α(I) ⊑α J .
The following definition and lemma will be used later on to suggest that the interpre-
tations that result during the construction of the minimum model, do not assign to
variables values of the form Tα where α is a limit ordinal.
Definition 6.5 An interpretation I of a given program P is called reasonable if for all
(p, Tα) ∈ I, α is not a limit ordinal.
Lemma 6.6 Let P be a program and I a reasonable interpretation of P . Then, for
all n < ω, T nP (I) is a reasonable interpretation of P . Moreover, if {T
n
P (I)}n<ω is an
α-chain, then T ωP,α(I) is a reasonable interpretation of P .
Proof. The proof of the first part of the theorem is by induction on n. For n = 0 the
result is immediate. Assume that T kP (I) is reasonable, and consider the case of T
k+1
P (I).
Now, if (p, Tα) belongs to T
k+1
P (I), where α is a limit ordinal, then there must exist a
clause p← B in P such that T kP (I)(B) = Tα. But this implies that there exists a literal
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l in B such that T kP (I)(l) = Tα. If l is a positive literal, then this is impossible due to the
induction hypothesis. If l is a negative literal, this is impossible from the interpretation
of ∼ in Definition 4.5.
The proof of the second part of the theorem is immediate: if (p, Tα) ∈ T
ω
P,α(I) then
(by the definition of T ωP,α) there exists k < ω such that (p, Tα) ∈ T
k
P (I). But this is
impossible from the first part of the theorem.
We now define a sequence of interpretations of a given program P (which can be thought
of as better and better approximations to the minimum model of P ):
Definition 6.7 Let P be a program and let:
M0 = T
ω
P,0(∅)
Mα = T
ω
P,α(Mα−1) for successor ordinal α
Mα = T
ω
P,α(
⊔
β<αMβ) for limit ordinal α
where:
(
⊔
β<α
Mβ)(p) =
{
(
⋃
β<α(Mβ♯β))(p) if this is defined
Fα otherwise
The M0,M1, . . . ,Mα, . . . are called the approximations to the minimum model of P .
From the above definition it is not immediately obvious that the approximations are
well-defined. First, the definition of T ωP,α presupposes the existence of an α-chain (for
example, in the definition of M0 one has to demonstrate that {T
n
P (∅)}n<ω is a 0-chain).
Second, in the definition of
⊔
β<αMβ above, we implicitly assume that
⋃
β<α(Mβ♯β) is
a function. But in order to establish this, we have to demonstrate that the domains
of the relations Mβ♯β, β < α, are disjoint (ie. that no predicate name participates
simultaneously to more than one Mβ♯β). The following lemma clarifies the above sit-
uation. Notice that the lemma consists of two parts, which are proven simultaneously
by transfinite induction. This is because the induction hypothesis of the second part is
used in the induction step of the first part.
Lemma 6.8 For all countable ordinals α:
1. Mα is well-defined, and
2. TP (Mα) =α Mα.
Proof. The proof is by transfinite induction on α. We distinguish three cases:
Case 1: α = 0. In order to establish that the sequence {T nP (∅)}n<ω is a 0-chain, we
use induction on n. For the basis case observe that ∅ ⊑0 TP (∅). Moreover, if we assume
that T nP (∅) ⊑0 T
n+1
P (∅), using the 0-monotonicity of TP we get that T
n+1
P (∅) ⊑0 T
n+2
P (∅).
Therefore, for all n < ω, T nP (∅) ⊑0 T
n+1
P (∅). It remains to establish that TP (M0) =0 M0.
From Lemma 6.4, T nP (∅) ⊑0 M0, for all n. By the 0-monotonicity of TP , we have
that for all n < ω, T n+1P (∅) ⊑0 TP (M0); moreover, obviously ∅ ⊑0 TP (M0). Therefore,
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for all n < ω, T nP (∅) ⊑0 TP (M0). But then, from the second part of Lemma 6.4,
M0 ⊑0 TP (M0). It remains to show that TP (M0) ⊑0 M0. Let p be a predicate in P such
that M0(p) = F0. Then, for all n, T
n
P (∅)(p) = F0. This means that for every clause of
the form p ← B in P and for all n < ω, T nP (∅)(B) = F0. This implies that there exists
a literal l in B such that for all n < ω, T nP (∅)(l) = F0 (this is easily implied by the fact
that {T nP (∅)}n<ω is a 0-chain). Therefore, M0(l) = F0 and consequently M0(B) = F0,
which shows that TP (M0)(p) = F0. Consider on the other hand a predicate p in P such
that TP (M0) = T0. Then, there exists a clause p← B in P such that M0(B) = T0. This
implies that for all literals l in B, M0(l) = T0. But then there exists a k such that for all
l in B and all n ≥ k, T nP (∅)(l) = T0 (this again is implied by the fact that {T
n
P (∅)}n<ω
is a 0-chain). This implies that for all n ≥ k, T nP (∅)(B) = T0 which means that for all
n ≥ k, T n+1P (∅)(p) = T0. Consequently, M0(p) = T0.
Case 2: α is a limit ordinal. Then, Mα = T
ω
P,α(
⊔
β<αMβ). Based on the induction
hypothesis one can easily verify that the domains of the relations Mβ♯β, β < α, are
disjoint and therefore the quantity
⊔
β<αMβ is well-defined (intuitively, the values of
order less than or equal to β in Mβ have stabilized and will not change by subsequent
iterations of TP ). Moreover, it is easy to see that the sequence {T
n
P (
⊔
β<αMβ)}n<ω is an
α-chain (the proof is by induction on n and uses the α-monotonicity of TP ).
It remains to establish that TP (Mα) =α Mα. We first show that Mα ⊑α TP (Mα).
Since {T nP (
⊔
β<αMβ)}n<ω is an α-chain, from Lemma 6.4, T
n
P (
⊔
β<αMβ) ⊑α Mα, for all
n < ω. By the α-monotonicity of TP we have that for all n < ω, T
n+1
P (
⊔
β<αMβ) ⊑α
TP (Mα); moreover, it is
⊔
β<αMβ ⊑α TP (Mα) (because
⊔
β<αMβ ⊑α TP (
⊔
β<αMβ) and
TP (
⊔
β<αMβ) ⊑α TP (Mα)). Therefore, for all n < ω, T
n
P (
⊔
β<αMβ) ⊑α TP (Mα). But
then, by Lemma 6.4, Mα ⊑α TP (Mα). Notice that this (due to the definition of ⊑α)
immediately implies that for all β < α, Mα =β TP (Mα).
It remains to show that TP (Mα) ⊑α Mα. It suffices to show that TP (Mα) ‖ Tα ⊆
Mα ‖ Tα and TP (Mα) ‖ Fα ⊇ Mα ‖ Fα. The former statement is immediate since (by
Lemma 6.6) values of the form Tα, where α is a limit ordinal, do not arise. Consider
now the latter statement and let p be a predicate in P such that Mα(p) = Fα. Then,
by the definition of T ωP,α, we get that for all n ≥ 0, T
n
P (
⊔
β<αMβ)(p) = Fα. Assume that
TP (Mα)(p) 6= Fα. Then, since Mα =β TP (Mα) for all β < α, it has to be TP (Mα)(p) >
Fα. But then this means that there exists a clause p← B in P such that Mα(B) > Fα.
This implies that for every literal l in B, it is Mα(l) > Fα. But then, by a case analysis
on the possible values that Mα(l) may have, one can show that there exists a k such
that for all l in B and for all n ≥ k, T nP (
⊔
β<αMβ)(l) > Fα. In other words, for this
particular clause there exists a k such that for all n ≥ k, T nP (
⊔
β<αMβ)(B) > Fα. But
this implies that for all n ≥ k, T n+1P (
⊔
β<αMβ)(p) > Fα (contradiction). Therefore,
TP (Mα)(p) = Fα.
Case 3: α is a successor ordinal. Then, Mα = T
ω
P,α(Mα−1). As before, it is straight-
forward to establish that {T nP (Mα−1)}n<ω is an α-chain. Moreover, demonstrating that
Mα ⊑α TP (Mα) is performed in an entirely analogous way as in Case 2. Notice that this
(due to the definition of ⊑α) immediately implies that for all β < α, Mα =β TP (Mα).
It remains to show that TP (Mα) ⊑α Mα. For this, it suffices to establish that
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TP (Mα) ‖ Tα ⊆ Mα ‖ Tα and TP (Mα) ‖ Fα ⊇ Mα ‖ Fα. Consider the former statement
and let TP (Mα)(p) = Tα, for some predicate p in P . Then, since Mα =β TP (Mα) for
all β < α, it has to be Mα(p) ≤ Tα. Moreover, since TP (Mα)(p) = Tα, there exists a
clause p ← B in P such that Mα(B) = Tα. This implies that for every literal l in B,
Mα(l) ≥ Tα. By a case analysis on the possible values that Mα(l) may have, one can
show that there exists a k such that for all n ≥ k, T nP (Mα−1)(l) = Mα(l). This implies
that for all n ≥ k, T nP (Mα−1)(B) = Mα(B) = Tα. This implies that for all n ≥ k,
T n+1P (Mα−1)(p) ≥ Tα and therefore Mα(p) ≥ Tα. Now, since Mα(p) ≤ Tα, we conclude
that Mα(p) = Tα.
The proof for the latter part of the statement is similar to the corresponding proof
for Case 2.
The following two lemmas are now needed in order to define the minimum model of
a given program:
Lemma 6.9 Let P be a program. Then, there exists a countable ordinal δ such that:
1. Mδ ‖ Tδ = ∅ and Mδ ‖ Fδ = ∅
2. for all β < δ, Mβ ‖ Tβ 6= ∅ or Mβ ‖ Fβ 6= ∅
This ordinal δ is called the depth of P 2.
Proof. The basic idea behind the proof is that since BP is countable and the set of
countable ordinals is uncountable, there can not exist an onto function from the former
set to the latter. More specifically, consider the set S of pairs of truth values of the form
(Tα, Fα), for all countable ordinals α. Consider the function F that maps each predicate
symbol p ∈ BP to (Tα, Fα) if and only if p ∈Mα ‖ Fα∪Mα ‖ Tα. Assume now that there
does not exist a δ having the properties specified by the theorem. This would imply
that every member of the range of F would be the map of at least one element from
BP . But this is impossible since BP is countable while the set S is uncountable. To
complete the proof, take as δ the smallest countable ordinal α such that Mα ‖ Tα = ∅
and Mα ‖ Fα = ∅.
The following property of δ reassures us that the approximations beyond Mδ do not
introduce any new truth values:
Lemma 6.10 Let P be a program. Then, for all countable ordinals γ ≥ δ, Mγ ‖ Tγ = ∅
and Mγ ‖ Fγ = ∅.
Proof. (Outline) The proof is by transfinite induction on γ. The basic idea is that
if either Mγ ‖ Tγ (respectively Mγ ‖ Fγ) was nonempty, then Mδ ‖ Tδ (respectively
Mδ ‖ Fδ) would have to be nonempty.
2The term “depth” was first used by T. Przymusinski in [Prz89].
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We can now formally define the interpretation MP of a given program P :
MP (p) =
{
Mδ(p) if order(Mδ(p)) < δ
0 otherwise
As it will be shown shortly, MP is the least fixpoint of TP , the minimum model of P
with respect to ⊑∞, and when it is restricted to three-valued logic it coincides with the
well-founded model [vGRS91].
7 Properties of MP
In this section we demonstrate that the interpretation MP is a model of P . Moreover,
we show that MP is in fact the minimum model of P under ⊑∞.
Theorem 7.1 The interpretation MP of a program P is a fixpoint of TP .
Proof. By the definition of MP and from Lemma 6.10, we have that for all countable
ordinals α it is MP =α Mα. Then, for all α, TP (MP ) =α TP (Mα) =α Mα =α MP .
Therefore, MP is a fixpoint of TP .
Theorem 7.2 The interpretation MP of a program P is a model of P .
Proof. Let p ← B be a clause in P . It suffices to show that MP (p) ≥ MP (B). We
have:
MP (p) = TP (MP )(p) (because MP is a fixpoint of TP )
= lub{MP (BC) | (p← BC) ∈ P} (Definition of TP )
≥ MP (B) (Property of lub)
Therefore, MP is a model of P .
The following lemma will be used in the proof of the main theorem of this section:
Lemma 7.3 Let N be a model of a given program P . Then, TP (N) ⊑∞ N .
Proof. Since N is a model of P , then for all p in P and for all clauses of the form
p← B in P , it is N(p) ≥ N(B). But then:
TP (N)(p) = lub{N(B) | (p← B) ∈ P} ≤ N(p)
Therefore, we have that TP (N)(p) ≤ N(p) for all p in P . Using Lemma 4.13, we get
that TP (N) ⊑∞ N .
Theorem 7.4 The infinite-valued model MP is the least (with respect to ⊑∞) among
all infinite-valued models of P .
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Proof. Let N be another model of P . We demonstrate that MP ⊑∞ N . It suffices to
show that for all countable ordinals α, if for all β < α it is MP =β N then MP ⊑α N .
The proof is by transfinite induction on α. We distinguish three cases:
Case 1: α = 0. We need to show that MP ⊑0 N . Now, since MP =0 M0, it
suffices to show that M0 ⊑0 N . By an inner induction, we demonstrate that for all
n < ω, T nP (∅) ⊑0 N . The basis case is trivial. Assume that T
n
P (∅) ⊑0 N . Using
the 0-monotonicity of TP , we get that T
n+1
P (∅) ⊑0 TP (N). From Lemma 7.3 it is
TP (N) ⊑∞ N which easily implies that TP (N) ⊑0 N . By the transitivity of ⊑0 we get
that T n+1P (∅) ⊑0 N . Therefore, for all n < ω, T
n
P (∅) ⊑0 N . Using Lemma 6.4 we get
that M0 ⊑0 N .
Case 2: α is a limit ordinal. We need to show that MP ⊑α N . Since MP =α Mα, it
suffices to show that T ωP,α(
⊔
β<αMβ) ⊑α N . This can be demonstrated by proving that
for all n < ω, T nP (
⊔
β<αMβ) ⊑α N . We proceed by induction on n. For n = 0 the result
is immediate. Assume the above statement holds for n. We need to demonstrate the
statement for n + 1. Using the α-monotonicity of TP , we get that T
n+1
P (
⊔
β<αMβ) ⊑α
TP (N). Now, it is easy to see that for all β < α, TP (N) =β N (this follows from the fact
that for all β < α, Mα =β N). From Lemma 7.3 we also have TP (N) ⊑∞ N . But then
it is TP (N) ⊑α N . Using the transitivity of ⊑α, we get that T
n+1
P (
⊔
β<αMβ) ⊑α N .
Therefore, for all n < ω, T nP (
⊔
β<αMβ) ⊑α N . Using Lemma 6.4 we get that Mα ⊑α N .
Case 3: α is a successor ordinal. The proof is very similar to that for Case 2.
Corollary 7.5 The infinite-valued model MP is the least (with respect to ⊑∞) among
all the fixpoints of TP .
Proof. It is straightforward to show that every fixpoint of TP is a model of P (the
proof is identical to the proof of Theorem 7.2). The result follows immediately since
MP is the least model of P .
Finally, the following theorem provides the connection between the infinite-valued
semantics and the existing semantic approaches to negation:
Theorem 7.6 Let NP be the interpretation that results from MP by collapsing all true
values to True and all false values to False. Then, NP is the well-founded model of P .
Proof. (Outline) We consider the definition of the well-founded model given by T.
Przymusinski in [Prz89]. This construction uses three-valued interpretations but pro-
ceeds (from an algorithmic point of view) in a similar way as the construction of the
infinite-valued model. More specifically, the approximations of the well-founded model
are defined in [Prz89] as follows (for a detailed explanation of the notation, see [Prz89]):
M0 = 〈T∅, F∅〉
Mα = Mα−1 ∪ 〈TMα−1, FMα−1〉 for successor ordinal α
Mα = (
⋃
β<αMβ) ∪ 〈T
⋃
β<αMβ
, F⋃
β<αMβ
〉 for limit ordinal α
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Notice that we have slightly altered the definition of [Prz89] for the case of limit ordinals;
the new definition leads to exactly the same model (obtained in a smaller number of
steps). One can now show by a transfinite induction on α that the above construction
introduces at each step exactly the same true and false atoms as the infinite-valued
approach.
8 A Model Intersection Theorem
In this section we demonstrate an alternative characterization of the minimum model
MP of a program P . Actually, the proposed characterization generalizes the well-known
model intersection theorem [vK76, Llo87] that applies to classical logic programs (with-
out negation).
The basic idea behind the model intersection theorem can be described as follows.
Let P be a given program and let M be the set of all its infinite-valued models. We
now consider all those models in M whose part corresponding to T0 values is equal to
the intersection of all such parts for all models in M, and whose part corresponding to
F0 values is equal to the union of all such parts for all models in M. In other words,
we consider all those models from M that have the fewest possible T0 values and the
most F0 values. This gives us a new set S0 of models of P (which as we demonstrate
is non-empty). We repeat the above procedure starting from S0 and now considering
values of order 1. This gives us a new (non-empty) set S1 of models of P , and so on.
Finally, we demonstrate that the limit of this procedure is a set that contains a unique
model, namely the minimum model MP of P . The above (intuitive) presentation can
now be formalized as follows:
Definition 8.1 Let S be a set of infinite-valued interpretations of a given program and
α a countable ordinal. Then, we define
∧α
S = {(p, Tα) | ∀M ∈ S,M(p) = Tα} and∨α
S = {(p, Fα) | ∃M ∈ S,M(p) = Fα}. Moreover, we define
⊙α
S = (
∧α
S)
⋃
(
∨α
S).
Let P be a program and let M be the set of models of P . We can now define the
following sequence of sets of models of P :
S0 = {M ∈M |M♯0 =
⊙
0M}
Sα = {M ∈ Sα−1 |M♯α =
⊙α
Sα−1} for successor ordinal α
Sα = {M ∈
⋂
β<α Sβ | M♯α =
⊙α⋂
β<α Sβ} for limit ordinal α
Example 8.2 Consider again the program of Example 6.1:
p ← ∼q
q ← ∼r
s ← p
s ← ∼s
r ← false
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We first construct the set S0. We start by observing that one of the models of the
program is the interpretation {(r, F0), (q, T1), (p, F2), (s, 0)}. Since this model does not
contain any T0 value, we conclude that for all M ∈ S0, M ‖ T0 = ∅. Moreover, since
the above model contains (r, F0), we conclude that for all M ∈ S0, (r, F0) ∈ M . But
this implies that (q, T1) ∈ M , for all M ∈ S0 (due to the second rule of the program and
the fact that M ‖ T0 = ∅). Using these restrictions, one can easily obtain restrictions
for the values of p and s. Therefore, the set S0 consists of the following models:
S0 = {{(r, F0), (q, T1), (p, vp), (s, vs)} | F2 ≤ vp ≤ T1, 0 ≤ vs ≤ T1, us ≥ vp}
Now, observe that the model {(r, F0), (q, T1), (p, F2), (s, 0)} belongs to S0. Since this
model contains only one T1 value, we conclude that for all M ∈ S1, M ‖ T1 = {q}.
Then, the set S1 is the following:
S1 = {{(r, F0), (q, T1), (p, vp), (s, vs)} | F2 ≤ vp ≤ T2, 0 ≤ vs ≤ T2, us ≥ vp}
Using similar arguments as above we get that the set S2 is the following:
S2 = {{(r, F0), (q, T1), (p, F2), (s, vs)} | 0 ≤ vs ≤ T3}
In general, given a countable ordinal α, we have:
Sα = {{(r, F0), (q, T1), (p, F2), (s, vs)} | 0 ≤ vs ≤ Tα+1}
Observe that the model {(r, F0), (q, T1), (p, F2), (s, 0)} is the only model of the program
that belongs to all Sα.
Consider now a program P and let S0, S1, . . . , Sα, . . . be the sequence of sets of models
of P (as previously defined). We can now establish two lemmas that lead to the main
theorem of this section:
Lemma 8.3 For all countable ordinals α, Sα is non-empty.
Proof. The proof is by transfinite induction on α. We distinguish three cases:
Case 1: α = 0. Let N∗ be the following interpretation:
N∗(p) =


T0, if ∀M ∈M (M(p) = T0)
F0, if ∃M ∈M (M(p) = F0)
T1, otherwise
It is easy to show (by a case analysis on the value of N∗(p)) that N∗ is a model of
program P and therefore (due to the way it has been constructed) that N∗ ∈ S0.
Case 2: α is a successor ordinal. Let N ∈ Sα−1 be a model of P . We construct an
interpretation N∗ as follows:
N∗(p) =


N(p), if order(N(p)) < α
Tα, if ∀M ∈ Sα−1 (M(p) = Tα)
Fα, if ∃M ∈ Sα−1 (M(p) = Fα)
Tα+1, otherwise
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We demonstrate that N∗ is a model of P . Assume it is not. Then, there exists a clause
p ← B in P such that N∗(p) < N∗(B). We perform a case analysis on the value of
N∗(p):
• N∗(p) = Fβ, where β ≤ α. Then, there exists M ∈ Sα−1 such that M(p) = Fβ.
Since M is a model of P , for all clauses p ← BC in P , it is M(BC) ≤ Fβ.
Consequently, for every such clause, there exists a literal lC in BC such that
M(lC) ≤ Fβ. But then, it is also N
∗(lC) ≤ Fβ (by the definition of N
∗ and since
all models in Sα−1 agree on the values of order less than α). This implies that
N∗(BC) ≤ Fβ . Therefore, for all clauses of the form p← BC , it is N
∗(p) ≥ N∗(BC)
(contradiction).
• N∗(p) = Tβ , β ≤ α. Since we have assumed that N
∗(p) < N∗(B), it is N∗(B) >
Tβ. This implies that for every literal l in B, it is N
∗(l) > Tβ . But then, given
any M ∈ Sα−1, it is also M(l) > Tβ (since all models in Sα−1 agree on the values
of order less than α). Therefore, M(B) > Tβ . But then, since M(p) = Tβ , M is
not a model of P (contradiction).
• N∗(p) = Tα+1. Since we have assumed that N
∗(p) < N∗(B), it is N∗(B) ≥ Tα.
But then, for every l ∈ B, it is N∗(l) ≥ Tα. Take now a modelM ∈ Sα−1 such that
M(p) < Tα (such a model must exist because otherwise it would be N
∗(p) ≥ Tα).
Now, it is easy to see that for every literal l in B, since it is N∗(l) ≥ Tα, it is
M(l) = N∗(l). This implies that M(B) ≥ Tα. But since M(p) < Tα, M is not a
model of P (contradiction).
Therefore, N∗ is a model of P . Moreover, due to the way it has been constructed,
N∗ ∈ Sα.
Case 3: α is a limit ordinal. Let N0 ∈ S0, N1 ∈ S1, . . . , Nβ ∈ Sβ, . . . , β < α, be models
of P . We construct an interpretation N as follows:
N(p) =
{
(
⋃
β<α(Nβ♯β))(p) if this is defined
Tα otherwise
It is easy to see that N is a model of P and that N ∈
⋂
β<α Sβ. This implies that the
set
⋂
β<α Sβ is non-empty (which is needed in the definition that will follow). Now we
can define an interpretation N∗ as follows:
N∗(p) =


N(p), if order(N(p)) < α
Tα, if ∀M ∈
⋂
β<α Sβ (M(p) = Tα)
Fα, if ∃M ∈
⋂
β<α Sβ (M(p) = Fα)
Tα+1, otherwise
Then, using a proof very similar to the one given for Case 2 above, we can demonstrate
that N∗ is a model of P . Due to the way that it has been constructed, it is obviously
N∗ ∈ Sα.
Lemma 8.4 There exists a countable ordinal δ such that if M ∈ Sδ then:
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1. M♯δ = ∅, and
2. for all γ < δ, M♯γ 6= ∅.
Proof. Since BP is countable, there can not be uncountably many Sα such that if
M ∈ Sα, M♯α 6= ∅. Therefore, we can take δ to be the smallest ordinal that satisfies
the first condition of the lemma.
We can now demonstrate the main theorem of this section which actually states that
there exists a unique model of P that belongs to all Sα:
Theorem 8.5
⋂
α Sα is a singleton.
Proof. We first demonstrate that
⋂
α Sα can not contain more than one models. As-
sume that it contains two or more models, and take any two of them, say N and M .
Then, there must exist a countable ordinal, say γ, such that N♯γ 6= M♯γ. But then, N
and M can not both belong to Sγ, and consequently they can not both belong to
⋂
α Sα
(contradiction).
It remains to show that
⋂
α Sα is non-empty. By Lemma 8.4, there exists δ such that
if M ∈ Sδ then M♯δ = ∅ (and for all γ < δ, M♯γ 6= ∅). Let N ∈ Sδ be a model (such a
model exists because of Lemma 8.3). We can now create N∗ which is identical to N but
in which all atoms whose value under N has order greater than δ are set to the value 0.
We demonstrate that N∗ is a model of the program. Assume it is not. Consider then a
clause p← B such that N∗(p) < N∗(B). There are three cases:
• N∗(p) = Fβ, β < δ. Then, N(p) = Fβ and since N is a model of P , we have
N(B) ≤ Fβ. But this easily implies that N
∗(B) ≤ Fβ, and therefore N
∗(p) ≥
N∗(B) (contradiction).
• N∗(p) = Tβ , β < δ. Then, N(p) = Tβ and since N is a model of P , we have
N(B) ≤ Tβ . But this easily implies that N
∗(B) ≤ Tβ, and therefore N
∗(p) ≥
N∗(B) (contradiction).
• N∗(p) = 0. Now, if N(p) ≤ 0 then (since N is a model) it is also N(B) ≤ 0. This
easily implies that N∗(B) ≤ 0. Therefore, N∗(p) ≥ N∗(B) (contradiction). If on
the other hand N(p) > 0 then N(p) < Tδ (because N
∗(p) = 0). Now, since N is a
model, we have N(B) < Tδ. But this easily implies that N
∗(B) ≤ 0 and therefore
N∗(p) ≥ N∗(B) (contradiction).
It is straightforward to see that (due to the way that it has been constructed) N∗ ∈ Sα
for all countable ordinals α. Therefore, N∗ ∈
⋂
α Sα.
Finally, we need to establish that the model MP of P produced through the TP
operator coincides with the model produced by the above theorem:
Theorem 8.6
⋂
α Sα = {MP}
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Proof. Let N∗ be the unique element of
⋂
α Sα. Intuitively, due to the way that it has
been constructed, N∗ is “as compact as possible” at each level of truth values. More
formally, for every model M of P and for all countable ordinals α, if for all β < α it
is N∗ =β M , then N
∗ ⊑α M (the proof is immediate due to the way that the sets Sα
are constructed). Then, this implies that N∗ ⊑∞ M . Take now M to be equal to MP .
Then, N∗ ⊑∞ MP and also (from Theorem 7.4) MP ⊑∞ N
∗. But since ⊑∞ is a partial
order, we conclude that N∗ = MP .
9 Discussion
In this section we argue (at an informal level) that the proposed approach to the se-
mantics of negation is closely related to the idea of infinitesimals used in Nonstandard
Analysis. Actually, our truth domain can be understood as the result of extending the
classical truth domain by adding a neutral zero and a whole series of infinitesimal truth
values arbitrarily close to, but not equal to, the zero value.
Infinitesimals can be understood as values that are smaller than any “normal” real
number but still nonzero. In general, each infinitesimal of order n + 1 is considered
to be infinitely smaller than any infinitesimal of order n. It should be clear now how
we can place our nonstandard logic in this context. We consider negation-as-failure as
ordinary negation followed by “multiplication” by an infinitesimal ǫ. T1 and F1 can be
understood as the first order infinitesimals ǫT and ǫF , T2 and F2 as the second order
infinitesimals ǫ2T and ǫ2F , and so on.
Our approach differs from the “classical” infinitesimals in that we include infinites-
imals of transfinite orders. Even in this respect, however, we are not pioneers. John
Conway, in his famous book On Numbers and Games, constructs a field No extending
the reals that has infinitesimals of order α for every ordinal α - not just, as our truth
domain, for every countable ordinal. Lakoff and Nunez give a similar (less formal) con-
struction of what they call the granular numbers [LN00]. It seems, however, that we are
the first to propose infinitesimal truth values.
But why are the truth values we introduced really infinitesimals? Obviously ǫT is
smaller than T , ǫ2T is smaller than ǫT , and so on. But why are they infinitesimals - on
what grounds can we claim that ǫT , for example, is infinitely smaller than T . In the
context of the real numbers, this question has a simple answer: ǫ is infinitely smaller
than 1 because n ∗ ǫ is smaller than 1 for any integer n. Unfortunately, this formulation
of the notion of “infinitely smaller” has no obvious analogue in logic because there is no
notion of multiplying a truth value by an integer.
There is, however, one important analogy with the classical theory of infinitesimals
that emerges when we study the nonstandard ordering between models introduced.
Consider the problem of comparing two hyperreals each of which is the sum of infinites-
imals of different orders, ie. the problem of determining whether or not A < B, where
A = a0+a1 ∗ ǫ+a2 ∗ ǫ
2+a3 ∗ ǫ
3+ · · · and B = b0+ b1 ∗ ǫ+ b2 ∗ ǫ
2+ b3 ∗ ǫ
3+ · · · (with the
ai and bi standard reals). We first compare a0 and b0. If a0 < b0 then we immediately
conclude that A < B without examining any other coefficients. Similarly, if a0 > b0
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then A > B. It is only in the case that a0 = b0 that the values a1 and b1 play a role. If
they are unequal, A and B are ordered as a1 and b1. Only if a1 and b1 are also equal do
we examine a2 and b2, and so on.
To see the analogy, let I and J be two of our nonstandard models and consider the
problem of determining whether or not I ⊑∞ J . It is not hard to see that the formal
definition of I ⊑∞ (given in Section 4) can also be characterized as follows. First,
let I0 be the finite partial model which consists of the standard part of I - the subset
I ‖ T0 ∪ I ‖ F0 of I obtained by restricting I to those variables to which I assigns
standard truth values. Next, I1 is the result of restricting I to variables assigned order
1 infinitesimal values (T1 and F1), and then replacing T1 and F1 by T0 and F0 (so that
I1 is also a standard interpretation). The higher “coefficients” I2, I3, . . . are defined in
the same way. Then (stretching notation) I = I0 + I1 ∗ ǫ + I2 ∗ ǫ
2 + · · · and likewise
J = J0 + J1 ∗ ǫ+ J2 ∗ ǫ
2 + · · · . Then to compare I and J we first compare the standard
interpretations I0 and J0 using the standard relation. If I0 ⊑0 J0, then I ⊑∞ J . But
if I0 = J0, then we must compare I1 and J1, and if they are also equal, I2 and J2, and
so on. The analogy is actually very close, and reflects the fact that higher order truth
values are negligible (equivalent to 0) compared to lower order truth values.
It seems that the concept of an infinitesimal truth value is closely related to the
idea of prioritizing assertions. In constructing our minimal model the first priority is
given to determining the values of the variables which receive standard truth values.
This is the first approximation to the final model, and it involves essentially ignoring
the contribution of negated variables because a rule with negated variables in its body
can never force the variable in the head of the clause to become T0. In fact the whole
construction proceeds according to a hierarchy of priorities corresponding to degrees of
infinitesimals. This suggests that infinitesimal truth could be used in other contexts
which seem to require prioritizing assertions, such as for example in default logic.
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